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The purpose of this paper ia to present a model of a trade economy in which
the dominance of certain agents over others playa a major róle. The agenta
are assumed to be organized in a hierarchical atructure, in which the agents
higher in the hierarchy dominate the agents lower in the hierarchy in the senae
of price setting.
In this model the information structure, which determinea the anticipated
reactiona of followera on a change of actiona by their leader, ia of crucial impor-
tance. We assume that agents correctly anticipate the actiona of all the agents
which are downstream from them in the hierarchical structure. Unfortunately
existence of equilibria can only be proved under rather restrictive conditiona.
Three examples are given in this paper. The first illustratea non-existence
of equilibrium. The other two illustrate the impact of different hierarchical
structures on the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.
'Thia paper is an elaborated veraion of a part of the mimeo "Eziatence of Equilibria in Hierar-
chically Structured Trsde Economies" by the same authors.
tThe authors would like to thank Dave Furth, Harold Houba and Dolf Talman for their eommenta
and useful suggeations .
tThia author ia Rnancielly aupported by the Netherlands organisation for scientific research
(N.W.O.), grant 450-228-009.1 Introduction
lt is generally acknowledged that one of the major flows in general equilibrium
theory is the absence of a model of price formation. Recently there has been
renewed interest in the modelling of competition in markets such that the structure
of the market is taken into account. One of the most natural features of such
a structiire is that of dominance oí one agent over another. In oligopoly theory
producers may act as leaders with respect to the price taking consumers. In such
case the dominance of the producer can be viewed as a natural consequence of his
individual attributes, in particular the ability to produce and to supply a large share
of the masket, in comparison with the individual attributes of the other agents in
the economy.
In other models of competition, however, dominance of one agent over another
is not a natural consequence of his individual attributes, but rather a consequences
oÍ the trading rules, i.e., of the "rules of the game". In most of these cases the rules
are describing some kind of institutional structure within the market, in which
dominance of one agent over another is a social economic phenomenon. This is
illustrated by referring to the traditional Stackelberg duopoly model, in which one
producer dominates the other by some externally given rule. Aumann (1973) and
Kalai et al. (1978) showed that in certain situations dominance over other agents
is not profitable as is the case in the Stackelberg model.
In this paper we follow this line of research. We assume that the dominance,
in the sence of price setting, of one agent over others is a result of a hierarchical
structure on the market, that is, the dominance relations between the agents in
the market is are designed top-down and result in several hierarchical levels. This
type of hierarchical structures is presented in theories of industrial organization as
given by Machup and Taber (1960) and Krelle (1976) and more recently in Robson
(1990) and Weber (1989). In general equilibrium theory this line of research resulted
in models of monopolistic competition with a flat hierarchical structure, e.g. in
Negishi (1961), Arrow and Hahn (1971) and, more recently, Roberts (1987). In
Gilles (1989) a model with a deeper hierarchical structure is given. In this paper
we follow, in this respect, the line as developed in Gilles (1989).
We consider a finite pure exchange economy that consists of an ordered set oí
agents, of an individual attribute space, and of institutional rules apecifying the
1relations between agents. The agents are ordered according to some hierarchical
dominance pattern. This hierarchy is described by a directed graph in which an arc
from one agent to another implies that the first agent dominates the second agent.
The dominating agent is called the leader, whereas the dominated agent is called
follower.
To circumvent complex situations arising from cycles and group descisions, we
assume that the hierarchy graph in the economy is a tree. Hence, the number
of trade relations is minimal with respect to the requirement that any agent is
potentially connected to any other agent in the economy through a finite number
of intermediary agents. This implies that if one destroys one of the trade relations
in such an economy, one arrives at the situation in which there are two separate
economies, which are not able to trade with each other through the given trade
relations. One thus arrives at situationa as described by Ioannides (1990) and
Haller (1990) who study the patterns of trading groups that emerge in models with
random trade relations between agents. In Spanjers (1991) specific situations in
which the trade relations do not form a tree are analyzed.
We assume that each relation has the institutional characteristics of a monolopy,
the leader in the relation sets the prices at which trade takea place, the follower
chooses the quantities to be traded on the relation. The leader in a relation has
the obligation to meet the quantities determined by the follower. So the agents
of the lowest hierarchical level in the economy only act as price takers, while the
agent of the highest hierarchical level only acts as a price setter. The agents of the
"inbetween" hierarchical levels act as price takers with on the relation with their
leader and act as price setters with respect to their followers.
An important queation to be anawered concerns the information that leading
agents have about the reactions of following agenta on the prices they set. There
are several plausible rules to derive the conjectures of an agent from his knowledge
of the individual characteristics of the agents and the institutional characteristics of
the relations. This problem occurs since the hierarchical structure of the economy
not only describes limitations on the possibilities to trade, but is also asaumed to
limit the possibilities of agents to communicate. As a consequence, agents may have
limited access to information on the reaction patterns of other agents.
In one extreme case, the case of local information, we assume each agent knowa
nothing but the institutional characteristics of the relations he is a part of and of
2the relations between his direct followers and and their leaders, and the individual
characteristics, being the initial endowments and the utility function, of himself and
of his direct followers. Furthermore he is assumed to know the sum of trades of each
of his followers with their followers, the prices set by for him by his leader(s), and
the prices set for his (direct) followers by their leaders. This information atructure,
which is called the local information etructure, is analysed in Spanjers e.a. (1991)
for an economy with a hierarchy tree and in Spanjers (1991) for a different class of
hierarchical structures.
The other extreme case is the eubgraph information etructure which describes
the situation in which each agent knows the individual characteristics of each of the
agents of which he is the (indirect) leader, knows the institutional characteristics
of the relations between those followers and their leaders, knows the institutional
characteristics of his own relations with his leaders, and, given the state of the
economy, knows the actions of his leaders and those of the leaders of his (indirect)
followers. This allows each agent to correctly anticipate the reactions of his followers
to his actions. In this paper we restrict ourselves to the subgraph information
structure.
The specification of knowledge of the agents in the economy for the subgraph
information structure corresponds to that of players in a multi-stage game with
a backward induction solution in Bicchieri (1989). Therefore, in the case of an
economy with a hierarchy tree, our equilibrium concept boils down to a subgame
perfect equilibrium in an economy where the agent who is highest in the hierarchy
moves firat, the agents who are of one hierarchical level lower move next, etc.,
provided this game is well defined. There appears to be a trade off between the
consistent economic interpretation of the specification of the model and the more
abstract game theoretic requirements.
An equilibrium in a hierarchically structured trade economy is defined to be a
tuple of actions of all agents such that these actions are feasible for every individual
agent, and such that no agents anticipates to be possibly better of by choosing
actions which are different from his equilbrium actions and which are feasible from
his point of view. We prove a theorem on the existence of such equilibria for an
economy with a hierarchy tree and the subgraph information structure with the
rather restrictive assumption that the set of feasible choices of the topagent in the
economy is non-empty.
3We give three examples of hierarchically structured trade economies. In the first
example we find that there does not exist an equilibrium because the set of feasible
actions of the top agent in the economy is empty, although this economy has only
three agents. From this example it also follows that the top agent in the economy
may end up with a consumption bundle which yields him a lower utility level than
his initial endowments. So it need not be advantageous to be the top-agent in the
economy. The reason for this is that the top agent does not always trade voluntary
because he has the obligation to meet the trades of his followers and he is the only
agent in the economy that does not have the possibility to transfer theses trades to
a leader.
The other two examples illustrate the impact the hierarchical structure of the
economy may have on the equilibrium outcomes. For a eet of three agents it shown
what the equilbria in the economy are for different hierarchy trees.
From the results as derived in this paper we conclude that in a hierarchically
structured trade economy with more than two hierarchical levels, a generic existence
result for certain straightforward extensions of well accepted equilibrium concepts
for the case of two echelons can no longer be proved. This especially illustrates that
the structure of the market in well known models has important consequences for
the existence of the equilibria for those situations. This shows that the trade - or
social economic - structure of the economy is crucial in the description of economic
trading processes.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model, we
derive the conjectures of the agents as a function of the information atructure and
we introduce the equilibrium concept. In Section 3 we prove the existence theorem.
The examples are presented in Section 4 and in Section 5 some concluding remarks
are made.
2 The Model
In this section we give a definition of hierarchically structured trade economies.
For a discussion of the background of this approach we refer to Gilles (1989). A
hierarchically structured trade economy is defined on the basis of an hierarchical
structure which, in this paper, is assumed to be a hierarchy tree. A hierarchy
tree is represented by a directed graph. We define the indegree of a point i in a
4directed graph A, W), being the number of ingoing arrows of the point i E A, by
P (i) :- {(h, i) E W with h E A}.
Deflnition 2.1 A Hierarchy Z~ee T:- (A, W) ia a (weakly~ connected, finite,
aimple directed graph which haa a tree atructure and ia auch that it haa exactly one
i E A auch that p(i) - 0.
For each agent i E A we use L; :- {h E A ~(h, i) E W} to denote the set of dírect
leaders of agent i and we use F; :- {j E A ~(i, j) E W} to denote the set of direct
followers of agent i.
A hierarchy tree is one of the possible hierarchical structures of an economy in
which an arc from agent i to agent j means that agent i has the initiative over agent
j. We say that i is the leader of agent j. So a source k in the graph (i.e. p (k) - 0)
represents an agent who has no leader. In the following we refer to agent k as the
"top-agent" in the hierarchicalstructure.
The fact that the hierarchy tree has a tree structure and only one source implies
that every agent i in the economy has at the most one (direct) leader. The hierarchy
graph describes a partial order over the set of agents; it directs the set of agents.
DeBnition 2.2 A Hierarchically Structured Z~ade Economy ia a tuple
E - ((A,W),{U;,m;};EA), where:
1. (A,W) ia a hierarchy tree.
t. U; : Rt ~ R ia the utility function of conaumer i which ia defined over an
1-dimenaional commodity apace. The utility function ia aaaumed to 6e atrictly
monotonic, continuoua and atrict quaai concave.
3. ~; E R~~ ia the initial endowment of agent i.
.~. We aaaume that each w -(i, j) E W ia a monopoliatic trade relation óetween
the agenta á and j where agent i ia the price aetter and agent j ia the price
taker with reapect to thia relation.
One could argue, as in Hahn (1978) and, implicitly, in Vind (1983), that the con-
jectures of the agents about consequences of their actions, ought to be part of the
description of the individual characteristics of the agents of the economy. Since we
want to derive the conjectures of the agents as a function of the hierarchical struc-
ture, the (other) individual characteristics of the agents and of the institutional
5characteristics of the hierarchical relations, we refrain from making the conjectures
of the agents an explicite part of the description of an economy.
We define a system of price vectors and trades of commodity bundles that we
allow to occur in our trade economy. Let S!-1 be the (1 - 1)-dimensional unit
simplex defined by
t
51-1 :- {q E R~ ~ ~ 9a - 1}.
a-~
We show that we can restrict ourselves to a compact price space contained in int
S~-1, the relative interior of S!-'
Define Sl :- {a E A ~ La - 0}. In order to construct a suitable compact price






We denote the solution to this problem with x;(q, m;). So x;(q, ~;) is the consump-
tion planned by agent an i~ Sl given the initial endowment w; and the price vector
q. Define for E J 0:
Q:- {q E Sl-' ~ q? e . 1i}.
We choose e such that:
q E S~-1 `Q ~ di E A` Sl : d c E {1,...,1} : x~(q,w;) ~ w~,
where ~-~;EA ~;. Such an e exists by of the strict monotonicity of the utility
functions of the agents. Denote sv :- (w~)~E{1,.,,,il where ~~ :- ~;Ea maxvEQ xK(q, c~).
We define the choice set of agent i to be X; - YL~ x QF, where Y:- {d E
R~ ~ -~ C d C c~}. Furthermore we denote
x :- jI x;.
:EA
6We give the following definition of a trade-price-allocation-system in an given hier-
archically structured trade economy. We assume E to be as defined above.
Deflnition 2.3 A Z~ade-Price-Allocation-System in the economy E ie a pair
(d, p, x) E YW x QW x YA where:
1. d;; E Y denotea the trade on the trade relation (i, j) E W. We define d; :-
(dhi)hEL; ~
t. p;; E Q ia the price ayatem denoting the pricea charged on the trade-relation
(i, j) E W. We define p; :- (p;;)jEF;.
3. x; E Y~ :- Y n R~ ia the conaumption bundle for agent i.
Agents assume that their actions do not influence the prices their leader sets for
them. On the other hand we assume that each agent correctly anticipates the
consequences for the demand of his followers as a function of the prices he sets. We
assume him to take into account the consequences possible changes in the prices
these followers set for the actions of their followers etc. This behaviour may occur if
each agent has perfect information about the subgraph starting from him and knows
nothing but the price his leader set for him, about the rest of the economy. Thus
we assume the subgraph of each agent is perfectly transparent for this agent, or at
least has the information that summarizes what trades come from his subgraph as
a function of the prices the agent sets for his followers. We call this specification of
knowledge the subgraph information structure.
The conjectures of the agents are described by their anticipated trade corre-
spondences. These anticipated trade correspondences are defined recursively, start-
ing with the agents j E Ao :- {j E A ~ F; - 0}, who do not have any follow-
ers. Then, given the anticipated trade correspondences for some set of agents Ai
with t E 1K, we derive the anticipated trade correspondences for the set of agents
Cc}1 :- {i E A`Bc ~ F; C Ac}. Then we define Atfl :- Ac U Cifl etc. We stop this
procedure when we have a t` such that A~. - A. Since 9{ is a hierarchy tree such a t'
exists. The aniticipated trade correspondences can thus derived using the following
definition. Note that, in this special case, any anticipated trade correspondencs t;;
is exactly the reaction correspondence of agent j with repect to the trades with
agent i.
7Deflnition 2.4 The Anticipated Z~ade Corrrespondence t;i : Q~ Y of agent
i with reapect to agent j E F; under aubtree information ia defined to be auch that
tii(9~f) - argmax~~~Ey{ max {Ui(ei; f~i - ~ emi) ~
y~EQF~ mEFj
q;i . ei; G 0 and b~m E Fj : e,,,i E tim(qim)}}.
Now we have defined the anticipated trade correspondences we define the budget
correspondence of some agent i with L; ~ 0 to be such that given the prices set by
his leader the corresponding budget set contains the actions agent i anticipates to
be feasible. We define the budget set of the top-agent to be the set of actiona he
anticipated to be feasible.
Deflnition 2.5 The Budget Correspondence B; : Q~ X; x Y~ of agent i with
L; -{h} under the aubgraph information atructure ie defined aa:
B~(ph:) -- {(e:h~9.~y;) E X; x Yt ~ eth ~ ph~ C 0
and y: C ~c -~ e~h - ~ ei;
iEF;
with ei; E t;i(q;i) }.
The óudget aet for the top-agent, i.e. the agent k with Lk - 0, ia defined aa:
Bk :- {(Qk~yk) E Xk X Y~ ~ yk C~k - ~ ejk
iEFA
with ejk E tki(Qkj) }.
The optimization problem of agent i who has some agent h as his direct leader ia
to maximize his utility over his budget set. Here his budget set depends on the
prices ph; his leader sets for him. Therefore agent i solves the following optimization
problem:
max U;(y;).
(~:A.4:.Y: ) E B:(PA: )
The optimization problem of the top-agent k in the economy is
max Uk(yk).
(ar.vA)EB.
Now we have described the individual optimization problem for every agent i we
define an equilibrium in the hierarchically structured trade economy in the case of
subtree information.
8Definition 2.6 A tuple ( d', p', x') E X x Yt ia an equilibrium in the trade econ-
omy E with aubtree information if `d i E A auch that ~ h E A with L; -{h}:
1. (d~,P:,x:) E Bi(Pi.;).
L. ~(e;h,q;,y;) E B;(ph;) auch that U;(y;) 1 U;(x;).
and for the top-agent k we have that
1. (pk,x~) E Bk.
S. ~(qkeTjk) E Bk auch that Uk(tfk) i Uk(xk)'
So an equilibrium is a tuple of actions of the agents in the economy such that:
1. ~FeaaíbilityJ The tuple is anitcipated to be feasible from the point of view of
each agent.
2. ~StabilityJ No agent can choose his actions, in a manner feasible given the
equilibrium tuple, in such a way that he anticipates this change in actions to
(possibly) make him better off.
3 Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we prove a theorem on the existence of equilibrium in a hierarchi-
cally structured trade economy with a hierarchy tree and the subgraph information
structure. First, in Lemma 3.1, we prove a11 anticipated trade correspondences have
compact graphs. In the proof of Theorem 3.2, the equilibrium existence theorem,
we use this lemma and we apply Weierstrass' Theorem.
As follows from the definition of the anticipated trade correspondences and our
equilibrium concept, we find that the equilibria in the hierarchically structured
trade economy correspond to the subgame perfect equilibria in the following game
and vice versa, if the game is well defined. In Stage 1 of the game the top agent
sets the prices for his followers. In Stage 2 these followers determine the amounts
they want to trade with the top agents and simultaneously they set the pricea for
trade with their followers, and so on for the next stages until each agent in the
economy has made his moves. Indeed, if the correaponding game would always be
well defined, we could have defined the subgraph information structure aa arising
from a multi-stage game.
9This property might lead to the idea to prove Theorem 3.2 by using the ex-
istence theorem of Harris (1985) or the theorem of Hellwig and Leininger (1987).
Unfortunately the budget correapondences as defined in Section 2 do not satisfy
the assumptions of this theorem. Nevertheless, by using some special properties
of our model we can proof an existence theorem. Unfortunately the conditions of
the existence theorem are rather restrictive and boil down to to the corresponding
multi-stage game being well defined.
The conditions for existence of equilibrium are satisfied, however, if for each
agent who has the top-agent as his direct leader, it holds that the function which
describes the profits an agent can make due to his position as a middleman ia aingle
peaked for every price his leader may set. This type of assumption is, amongst
others, made in Marschak and Selten (1974) and Krelle (1976).
In the Lemma 3.1 we make use of the property that we can split the optimization
problem of an agent i E A with L; ~ 0 in maximizing his profits from trade and
optimizing his consumption given his income. The profits from trade of agent i
are the profits he can make because of his position as a middleman. The profits
from trade and his initial endowments determine the income of agent i, which
determines his set of affortable consumption bundles over which he maximizes his
utility function.
Lemma 3.1 `d a E A, j E F; it holda that t;j hae a compact graph.
Proof
We prove this theorem by induction.
Starting Condition: Suppose Fj - 0, Lj -{i}. Then t;j has a compact graph.
This follows directly from applying the Maximum Theorem.
Induction Hypotheaia: Suppose Fj ~ 0, Lj - {i}. Suppose that for each m E Fj it
holds that tj,,, has a compact graph. Then it holds that t;j has a compact graph.
Proof of the Induction Hypotheaia





-~ pj , {eji},~ 1 ~ eji
Vn E IN` {0} : ej; E t;j(p;~)
10then
E t;i(Po )~
Define iri : Q~ R to be such that ai(p;i) is that set of values of ~r of the solutions,
given p;i, of
max ~r :- ~ (qim - P;i) ' emi
(4i,~.~~o.i),~.EFiE(QxY)F~ mEFj
such that
e,~.; E ti,n(qim) for each ~n. E Fi.
~i(p;i) is the maximal profit from trade that agent j can induce given p;i, evalu-
ated at prices p;i. Since t1m E Fi the correspondence tim has a compact graph by
assumption, it follows by the Maximum Theorem that ~ri can be represented by a
continuous function. Furthermore it holds for all p;i E Q that ~ri(p;i) ~ 0. Define
the correspondence Eci : Q~(Q x Y)Fi such that (qi,,,,e,,,i),nEFi E i~i(P:i) if and
only if the tuple (qi,,,, e,,,i~,,,EFi maximizes the profits for trade of agent j given p;i.
From the Maximum Theorem it follows that N,i has a compact graph.
The optimal consumption bundles for agent j at prices p;i E Q, as they follow





P.i ' yi ~ ~i(P:i) ~ P:i ' wi ~
and vice versa.
By the continuity of the innerproduct for p;i E Q, since Ui is a continuous function
and since ~ri is a continuous non-negative function, we can apply the Maximum
Theorem. Since Ui is strict quasi-concave and since the set of feasible yi is convex
for given p;i, we can represent the solutions oí the problem by a continuous function
xi : Q--~ Yt of p;i such that xi(p;i) is the optimal attainable consumption bundle
for agent j.
11By definition the trades e~; E t;i(p;i) follow from solving the optimization problem
of agent j as described in Section 2. Using the strict monotonicity of U~ we find that
this is equivalent to stating that for each n E I~1 there exist (q~,n,emi),,,EF; E~Ci(p~)
such that
eii - ~ emi f xi(P ~ ) - ~i for all n E II~l `{0}.
mEFj
By the continuity of xi, by the continuity of the summation and since ~i has a
compact graph we have that 3(qo,,, en,i),,,EF~ E{ei such that
0
emi f xi(P~i) - ~i.
mEF~
But this is equivalent with eo; E t;i(po )
The fact that T is a hierarchy tree completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.2 [Existence Theorem~




Follows directly from Definition 2.6 .
If
First we show that the budget correspondence B; has compact and non-empty val-
ues for every i E A. Since by Lemma 3.1 we have that for all i E A, j E Fi the
anticipated trade correspondence t;i has a compact graph, the budget correspon-
dences 13; have compact values. Let i E A, L; ~(D. Let h E L;. Now for every
pti; E Q it holds that ( e;h,q;,y;) E B;(ph;) for e;h :- ~iEF ei; with ei; E t;i(ph;~,
4: -- (Ph~)jEF; and y; :- ~;. Therefore B; does not have empty values.
Furthermore if L; - 0, then by assumption we have that B; ~ l~. Since ~{ is a
hierarchy graph we have by Backward Induction (repeatedly applying Weierstrass'
Theorern) that an equilibrium in E exists.
12Q.~.D.
The following corollary states that if for each of the direct followers of the top-
agent k it holds that the profits from trade function is single peaked for each price
vector agent k may choose to set. This is a common assumption in the realm of
successive monopolies. This type of assumption can, amongst others, be found in
Marschak and Selten (1974) and Krelle (1976).
Corollary 3.3 If for each agent i with F; ~~ and L; -{k}, with Lk - Ql, it holde
that for all ph; E Q we have that tr,;(ph;) ia aingleton valued, then an equilibrium in
E exist~.
Proof
By Lemma 3.1 we know that tk; has a compact graph. By the singleton valuedness
of ~; and the strict quasi concavity of U; we know that tk; must be singleton valued
and therefore corresponds to a continuous function. Since Xk is a convex set it
follows by the Mean Value Theorem that there exists a system of prices (qk;)íEF.
such that ~;EFF tk;(qk;) - 0. Therefore we have that Bk is non-empty and thus by
Theorem 3.2 we know that an equilibrium in E exists.
Q.E.D.
4 Some Examples
In this section we give three examples oí trade economies. The first example illus-
trates the possible non-existence of equilibrium in a trade economy with subgraph
information. In this example we do not make explicite use of the specific util-
ity functions and intitial endowments of the agents in the economy. The chosen
specifications are made in order to simplify the calculations.
In the other two examples we investigate the influence of different hierarchy
trees on the equilibrium outcomes in the economy. In order to do so we consider
an economy with two commodities and three agents for which we calculated the
equilibria for different hierarchy trees. We investigate whether some hierarchy trees
lead to more efficient equilibrium outcomes in the economies than others.
Example 4.1
Consider economy with two goods, commodity 1 and commodity 2, and three
13agents. Assume the hierarchy tree is 1' :- ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (b, c)}), i.e. agent a
is the top agent, agent b is the middle-man and agent c is of the lowest hierarchical
level. We use pl as the price of commodity 1. Given pl the price pz of commodity 2
follows by pz - 1- pl . Agent c has a net-demand function which has the following
form on the interval [Z, 4].
d~i(Pbl) -
( 32P61 - 16
I 16pb1 - 7
3













This net-demand function is continuous and monotonous on the interval [ á, á]. From
the strict monotonicity of the utility functions it follows that the total value of the
trade over each trade relation will be zero, so the net-demand function of agent c
for commodity 2 is:
dez(Pbl ) -
-P61 . d~l (Pbl ). 1 - pbl
The functions d~l and dcz are depicted in Figure 1.
The optimization problem of agent b can be separated in maximizing the (an-
ticipated) income from the trade with agent c, and maximizing his utility given his
total wealth at the prices set for him by agent a.
The function denoting the income from trade for agent b at price pbl, given the
net-demand functions of agent c and given the price pal set by agent a is
~(Pai,Pbl) - (Pbl - Pal)d~l(Pbl) ~-((1 - Pbi) - (1 - Pal))d2(Pbl)
- (P61 - pal )del (Pbl ) ~ (Pal - Pbl )p46 . dQ (Pbl )
- (Pbl - Pal)(~p ~ 1)d~l(Pbl)
- (Pbl - Pal ) 1-Pb1 d~~ (Pbl ).
The (anticipated) incume from trade for agent b as a function oí pb~ for pai - 3 a
is drawn in Figure 2. The net-demand function of agent c corresponds to the
anticipated trade correspondence ty~.
The income from trade function of agent b has two global maxima, each corre-
sponding to a different anticipated trade between agent c and agent b. The value
14FIGURE 1: The net-demand functions of agent c.
15rr
FIGURE 2: The income from trade function ir(á,pbl).
of the income from trade function in each of the maxima is 1, the corresponding
prices pbl are pbl - e and pbl - 1e.
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the income from trade function of agent b for the
prices pal - 32 and pal - 3z . For each of these prices pal there exists a unique
global maximum of the income from trade function of agent b, although there are
two local maxima. For pai C á the anticipated trade of agent c in commodity 1
l o .1
FICURE 3: The income from trade function a(3á,pbl).














FIGURE 5: The anticipated trade correspondence t,b.
17of the trades for the the prices that maximize the income from trade for agent b at
pal - 4. For pal 1 4 the anticipated trades of agent c in commodity 1 at the prices
that maximize the income from trade for agent b are smaller than the smallest of
tlle trades for the the prices that maximize the income from trade for agents b at
3
Pal - 4.
Now suppose that agent b has a net-demand for commodity 1 for his own con-
sumption of 4 units, for each of the prices pal E[é, e], independent of the income
from the trade with agent c. Using the budget constraint and the strict mono-
tonicity of the utility functions we arrive at the following net-demand function of
agent b as function of the prices following from pal, disregarding the amounts of the
commodities necessary for the trade with agent c:
d6(Pal ) - ~- . dbl (Pal )
-3Pn1
- 1-Pai ~
This leads to the trade correspondence of agent 6 as depicted in Figure 5. Thia is
exactly the anticipated trade correspondence tab. Lemma 3.1 and the Maximum
Theorem ensure this correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, but it need not be
singleton valued. The non-convexity in the value of the anticipated trade correspon-
dence at pal - á is caused by the exiatence of two global maxima of the income
from trade function of agent 6 at price pal - 4.
Assume agent a has relatively small endowments of the commodities 1 and 2 as
in Figure 5. We safely assume that the total net-demand of agent b for commodity
1 does not decrease as pal decreases and that it does not increase as pal increasea.
Now the non-convexity in the value of the anticipated trade correspondence makes
it impossible for agent a to set a price pal such that he can supply the amount he
(correctly) anticipates agent b to order in their trade relation at pal. But then no
equilibrium in the economy as in this example exists.
Example 4.2
Consider an economy with two goods, commodity 1 and commodity 2, which con-
sists of three agents, a, 6 and c, i.e. A-{a, 6, c}. We assume commodity 1 to be
the numeraire and we assume
Ua(xa) - ( xal ~- xaz)Z, ~a - (~,~)
lÍ6(26) -( 261 f t62)Z, w6 -(1,~)
Uc(xe) - ( ~cl ~ xc2)Zi Wc - (~, 1)
18With respect to this set of agents we consider the following three different hierarchy
trees:
71 :- (A, {(a, b), (b, c)})
7Z :- (A, {(a, b), (a, c)})
73 :- (A, {(b, a), (a, c)})
In the economy which has T as its hierarcy tree we use p to denote pab and we use
q to denote py~, for TZ we use p to denote pab and q to denote pQ~ and finally for T3
we use p to denote p~ and q to denote pa~.
This example is such that an allocation is Pareto efficient if and only if ~;EA U;(x;)
- 4. So we may represent the efficiency of the organization as it follows from a hier-
archy tree T which has x' as its equilibrium allocation as Eff(T) :- 4~iEA U:(x;).
Thus we find the equilibria as in Table I.
For T we find that the equilibrium corresponds to the duopoly outcome where
TABLE I: Equilibrium Values











Ua(x~) 0 0.6864 0.3069
Ub(xb) 2.2290 1.4142 1.8141
Ua(x~ ) 1.5730 1.4142 1.3823
Efl'iciency 95.05e1o 87.87o-Io 87.58P1o
19agent 6 dominates agent c. If we delete agent a from the economy the equilibrium
outcome does not change. As Example 4.1 shows us, this does not hold in general,
we may have individual characteristics of the agents b and c such that no equilib-
rium exists if agent a has (0, 0) as his vector of initial endowments. We find that in
an economy with three agents and a structure as above, a top-agent with zero initial
endowments either does not matter, or is the cause of non existence of equilibrium.
In the economy which has Tz as its hierarchy tree we find that agent a has the
position of a monopolist who can perform price discrimination between the agents b
and c. The consumption of agent a is non zero because his power as an intermediary
allows him to make profits from trade. Therefore we can interpret the level of utility
agent a achieves as a measure of the value of his position as intermediary.
For T3 we find that the consumption of agent a lower than it was for T~. So
his position as an intermediary in this structure is of less value than it was in the
second example.
We find that Tl is the most efficient hierarchy tree for this example, although
for none of the structures the outcomes are prefered by all agents to the outcomes
of another structure. Therefore we may say that in this example non of the above
three structures dominates another of these structures. The efficiency attained for
7 in this example is also attained for the hierarchy trees which have as their set of
arrows {(a, c), (c, b)} {(b, c), (c, a)} {(c, b), (b, a)} {(b, c), (b, a)} or {(c, 6), (c, a)}.
Example 4.3
Consider an economy E with two goods, commodity 1 and commodity 2, such that
E:- ({a, b, c}, {(a, b), (a, c)}). We assume commodity 1 to be the numeraire and we
assume:
Ua(xa) - xal ~ xQ2 ~a - (0,0)
Ub(~b) - ~61 ~ ~62 ~b - (1, 0)
Uc(~c) - xcl f xc2 ~c -(0~ 1)
As in Example 4.2 we consider the following three different hierarchy trees with
respect to this set of agents.
T :- (A, {(a, b), (b, c)})
Tz :- (A, {(a, b), (a, c)})
T3 :- (A, {(b, a), (a, c)})
20In the economy whích has 71 as its hierarcy tree we use p to denote pab and we use
q to denote p~, for 72 we use p to denote pab and q to denote pa~ and finally for T3
we use p to denote p~ and q to denote pa~.
Although we refrain form defining efFiciency in an exact manner, we maintain
that we take Pareto efficient outcomes to have an efficiency rate of 100010. In this
TnBLE II: Equilbrium Values
Variable Ti Ta 73
p' 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333
q' 0.6667 0.6667 0.6667
x~l 0 0.5000 0
xá2 0 0.5000 0
xbl 0.5000 0 0.5000
xb2 1 0.5000 1
x~l 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
xc2 0 0 0
Ua(xal) 0 1.25 0
U6(xb,) 2.50 1 2.50
U~(x~l ) 1 1 1
Efficiency 100010 100QI'o 100010
example, contrary to the previous example, for each of the hierarchy trees the
equilibrium outcomes are Pareto efI'icient, and therfore each of these equilibia has an
efficiency of 100P1o. In Table II we find that in the economy with 73 the intermediary,
agent a, does not have any advantage from his position as a middleman. His
presence does not even influence the outcome as compared to the duopoly outcome
for the agents b and c with agent b dominating agent c.
In the economy with TZ, however, we find that agent a, in his position as a price
differentiating monopolist, can claim the entire surplus from trade. In this economy
21his position as an intermediary is very valuable indeed.
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